Intuicje moralne. O poznaniu dobra i zła
Słowa kluczowe:
intuicja, moralność, poznanie, dobro moralne, zło moralne, emocje, poznanie moralne, wgląd, etyka, epistemologia, intuicja moralna, intuicjonizm etyczny, percepcja moralna, refleksyjna równowaga, cnoty intelektualneStreszczenie
Praca jest poświęcona zagadnieniu intuicji moralnych oraz ich zdolności do uzasadniania naszych moralnych przekonań. Składa się z siedmiu rozdziałów. Rozdział pierwszy prezentuje krótki rys historyczny intuicjonizmu moralnego, z głównym akcentem położonym na intuicjonizm brytyjski XVII, XVIII, XIX i pierwszej połowy XX wieku. Zwieńczenie rozdziału stanowi prezentacja argumentów, które doprowadziły do osłabienia tego nurtu. Są to kolejno zarzut dziwaczności faktów moralnych, dziwaczności intuicji moralnej (jako władzy poznawczej), zarzut subiektywności intuicji, zarzut dogmatyzmu, arbitralności, zarzut z niezgody moralnej.
Rozdziały II - V stanowią kolejno krytyczną prezentację współczesnych prób obrony intuicjonizmu (tzw. nowego intuicjonizmu) podejmowanych przez takich autorów jak Robert Audi, Michael Huemer, Timothy Chappell, Sabine Roeser, James Sias. Przedstawione w tych rozdziałach stanowiska w dużej mierze unikają wymienionych powyżej zarzutów, niemniej można wysuwać przeciwko nim nowe zarzuty (analizowane przy okazji prezentacji każdej z propozycji nowego intuicjonizmu). Rozdział VI stanowi próbę zintegrowania tych stanowisk w taki sposób, aby łączyć ich silne strony jednocześnie unikając i słabości. W świetle tego rozdziału obroniona została główna teza pracy, mianowicie, że moralne intuicje mają zdolność uzasadniania naszych moralnych przekonań i jako takie mogą stanowić wiarygodne źródło poznania moralnego.
W duchu nowego intuicjonizmu autor przyjmuje omylność intuicji moralnych, stąd rozdział VII stanowi propozycję doskonalenia intuicyjnego poznania moralnego poprzez stosowanie metody refleksyjnej równowagi oraz doskonalenia cnót poznawczych.
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