Ethics and Contingency. Bernard Williams` Project of Anti-Theoretical Ethics
Keywords:
Bernard Williams, the absolute conception of the world, knowledge, scientific realism, naturalism, atheism, contingency, luck, metaphilosophy, scientism, philosophy as a humanistic discipline, ethics, morality, morals, metaethics, ethical theory, anti-theory in ethics, moral particularismSynopsis
The book aims to reconstruct and critically analyze Bernard Williams` project of anti-theoretical ethics. I try to overcome the interpretative difficulties generated by the specific features of the British philosopher`s thought – his skepticism, multiple, essayistic form of expression - assuming the hypothesis that this project can be explicated and accurately captured only in relation to its epistemological, metaphysical, anthropological and metaphilosophical premises. The book contains five chapters.
The first chapter makes an introduction to a reader who is not much familiar with the author of Moral luck. I begin with a biographical sketch covering the main events of his life and academic career. I also attempt to depict Williams` complex personality. The chapter includes a brief presentation of his twelve philosophical books: five monographs, one co-authored book, and six collections of essays and papers. I conclude the chapter by trying to explain the significance of the intellectual achievements of the British author in the context of the main 20th-century currents in ethics and metaethics in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical world.
The second chapter is dedicated to Williams' epistemological, metaphysical and anthropological assumptions. I start by focusing on the concepts of belief and knowledge, which, according to Williams, require us to accept metaphysical realism, (in his jargon: “the absolute conception of the world”). Williams interprets metaphysical realism in the spirit of scientific realism, which he justifies by three arguments: the argument from technique, the argument from convergence, and the argument from the theory of error. I try to show how Williams connects such an interpretation of metaphysical realism with the adoption of naturalism (in both methodological and metaphysical sense), with a critique of Christian theism, and with the recognition of anthropological contingentism - a claim that human beings and their creations are radically contingent beings. At the end of the chapter, I discuss the criticism of this set of Williams` claims developed by authors such as John McDowell and Hilary Putnam.
Chapter three is devoted to Williams` metaphilosophical position. I begin by describing the motives and goals that Williams associates with philosophy. Later, I show why he rejects a realistic interpretation of philosophical concepts and propositions. Then I discuss the humanistic idea of philosophy proposed by Williams, according to which it should be a discipline devoid of cognitive pretensions and aware of the historical and cultural conditions of philosophical concepts. In his opinion philosophers should be looking for such interpretations of the world that could satisfy our intellectual, practical, and existential needs, including the overarching needs for hope and meaning. I also present the method of conceptual analysis, the genealogical method, and the method of alienation. They are the instruments with which the author of Shame and Necessity practiced his metaphilosophical program and which were a subject of his methodological reflection. The chapter ends with a presentation of a series of objections to the humanistic conception of philosophy. These objections lead to the conclusion that - contrary to Williams' declarations - he adopts many elements of a scientistic vision of the world.
Chapter four is the first of two chapters that deal directly with the project of anti-theoretical ethics. This project is formulated in the context of Socrates' question ("How should one live?"), and the construction of the project begins with scrutinizing the assumptions of this question. In this context Williams distinguishes three intellectual traditions in the history of moral reflection, which he then analyzes: (1) the "tradition" of amoralism, according to which it is possible to answer this question and in doing so ignore moral considerations altogether (2) the tradition of morality, the aim of which is to construct a quasi-scientific ethical theory and (3) the tradition of ethics, focusing on the practical dimension of morals and their empirical, contingent conditions. I show that the British philosopher declares himself a supporter of the third tradition and then I present his reasons for it. In conclusion, I address the problem of the first-order normative statements, which are essentially absent in Williams' texts.
In the fifth and final chapter, I describe the two essential components of the project of anti-theoretical ethics. The first component is metaethical. After rejecting the cognitive aspirations of philosophy and adopting naturalism, Williams rejects both moral realism and cognitivism. At the same time, he defends the possibility of ethical knowledge, understood, however, as culturally relative practical knowledge enabling us to navigate the particular social world. The second component encompasses anti-theoretical ideas in ethics, a kind of trademark of Williams. I start the passage devoted to this issue by analyzing his definition of ethical theory. Then I discuss in detail the arguments formulated against the very idea of ethical theory. I identify five such arguments which refer to (1) moral experience, (2) moral emotions, (3) the integrity of an agent, (4) the concept of moral duty, and (5) moral luck. Next, I discuss Williams’ criticism of the most important theories, i.e., utilitarianism, Kantian theory of duty, and neo-Aristotelianism. I connect both groups of arguments with their epistemological, metaphysical, anthropological, and metaphilosophical assumptions, which I reconstructed in chapters two and three. I also connect these arguments with the general image of morals accepted by the British philosopher that was reconstructed in chapter four. Looking for a general category to describe the position that Williams advocates at the intersection of ethics and metaethics, I am in favor of moral particularism, by which I mean the view that ethical rationality is possible, but moral reasons do not have objective status. Still, in Williams` view, they are relative to the subject's personal identity and his or her moral culture. I end the chapter, as in the case of chapters two and three, with a discussion of selected arguments raised against Williams by such philosophers as Christine Korsgaard, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon.
At the end of the book, I show some limitations of the interpretation presented in it. I try to indicate how and in which directions it could be further developed.
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